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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
Category No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied on review to determine 
whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on August 24, 
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is 
contained in the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Frank David Gentry, was charged with theft 
by deception, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
405 (1990), and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990). 
After defendant pled not guilty to the charges, trial 
commenced before the district court sitting without a jury. 
After the close of the evidence, but prior to closing arguments, 
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a 
third degree felony. The State dismissed the criminal trespass 
charge. The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed 
defendant on eighteen months' probation. 
Over two months after the acceptance of his guilty 
plea, defendant moved to withdraw it. The trial court denied 
this motion. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and remanded the case for a new trial on the original charges. 
State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not 
necessary for purposes of this petition. The relevant facts are 
those stated above in the Statement of the Case. 
The facts underlying the charges against defendant are 
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Gentry, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-27. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V, GIBBONS/ 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987) , 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued, 
inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court 
failed to explain to [him] the elements and facts of the crime of 
theft before he pled guilty, and . . . further erred by relying 
on an incomplete record as a substitute for Rule 11 compliance[] 
in determining that [he] entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences." State v. Gentry, 141 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 27. The State responded that, under the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court on post-
conviction review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see, 
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
2 
curiam), the trial court had not abused its discretion. 
The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
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In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively 
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole" test 
applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons, this Court 
"effectively replac[ed] the 'record as a whole' test with a 
strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in accepting a defendant's 
guilty plea," Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28—i.e., if the 
trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11(5), the guilty 
plea, although perhaps otherwise voluntary, must automatically be 
vacated. This conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores 
significant language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court that clearly cuts against the notion that 
Gibbons abandoned the record as a whole test for determining the 
voluntariness, and thus validity, of a guilty plea. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate." Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant's pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
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guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook, this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how those elements related to the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must 
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
finding, the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
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and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). And in State v. 
Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have the 
defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record 
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, this Court did 
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either 
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in 
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply 
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet 
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entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Jolivet# 784 
P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously undermines the court of appeals' 
effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the 
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they 
3 
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. Significantly, in State v. 
Smith/ 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea, this Court apppeared to apply the record as whole 
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
4 
motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
4 
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in the instant 
case, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, and stating directly in 
State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct. 
App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after Gentry, that Smith 
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons." 
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it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to to hold any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
5 
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent 
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this court in a 
variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 
5 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise 
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to 
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of 
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea 
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined 
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by 
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived). 
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(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional 
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with 
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the 
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Interestingly, the court of 
appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State 
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief. 
See State v. Gentry, Case No. 890145-CA, Br. of Appellee at 17-
18. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
 / 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ££ day of September, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^ W t ^ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
/- -. ,-„ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to George T. 
Waddoups, Attorney for Respondent, 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84107, this o?^Slav of September, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
been excluded, if the defense was not to be 
permitted to call AJvin Barker in rebuttal. 
Having concluded that the court erred in 
failing to exclude Deputy Troester's restate-
ment of AJvin Barker's opinion of Deputy 
Naylor's performance, we^must now consider 
whether this error was harmless or prejudicial. 
An error is harmless, and not grounds for 
reversing a conviction, if, absent the error, 
there is no substantial likelihood of a better 
result for the defendant. Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(a); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 116, 
120-122 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, one of the main points of the 
defense was that Deputy Naylor's use of force 
was excessive and overly aggressive. There 
were substantial factual discrepancies between 
the eyewitnesses' accounts of what happened, 
and Deputy Naylor's account (from which we 
have drawn the above statement of the facts) 
tends more to justify his role in this alterca-
tion than do the accounts of the Barker 
parents and of Gary Barker. In resolving this 
factual conflict, the testimony of Alvin Barker 
may well have been important. Alvin Barker 
intervened m the fight to aid Deputy Naylor in 
ending the struggle, but at trial, he saw no 
need for the deputy's resort to violence and 
portrayed Gary Barker's actions as mainly 
evasive and self-protective. Thus, the jury 
could well have found that Alvin Barker's 
testimony was critical in determining what 
happened, assessing the extent and nature of 
Gary Barker's resistance, and in evaluating his 
claim of self-defense. 
Given the conflicting evidence, and also in 
view of the rather lengthy jury deliberations, 
this appears to have been a close case factu-
ally. We therefore conclude that, if Alvin 
Barker's hearsay statement had been excluded 
or if Alvin Barker had been permitted to 
testify concerning it, there is a significant 
possibility of a result more favorable to the 
defendant Gary Barker. 
We therefore reverse and remand. 
Robert L. Newey, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1990). 
2. Deputy Naylor was the only witness called by the 
State who was present when the crime was commi-
tted. Since the jury found for the State, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 
convictions, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989). We have therefore relied extensively on 
Deputy Naylor's testimony and resolved conflicts 
and doubts in the evidence according to his view of 
the facts. 
3. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
Barker CODE»CO 
*» »«T »* Provo, Uffa 
4. See United States v. Brennao, 798 F.2d 581, 587-
89 (2d Or. 1986) cert, denied, _U.S.__, 109 S. Ct. 
1003 (1989); United States v. WWiams, 751 F.2d 
594, 606-10 (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 
1003 (1985). 
5. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 686-87 (7th 
Cir. 1982) cert, denied 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); United 
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971); see 
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 
838, 844 (1988) (cross-examination requirement of 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) and right of confrontation 
are satisfied where declarant takes the stand and 
responds to questions concerning the out-of-court 
statement despite claimed lack of recall); 4 D. 
Louiseil & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §419 at 
179-81 (1985). 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Frank David GENTRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890145-CA 
FILED: August 24, 1990 
Fifth District, Iron County 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
ATTORNEYS: 
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and 
Greenwood. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Frank D. Gentry appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. We reverse and remand. 
Gentry was one of six children born to 
Milton and Ivy Jane Gentry. Milton owned a 
1,840 acre ranch located near the Beaver/ 
Iron County line in southern Utah. In 1949, 
Gentry built a cinder block cabin on the 
ranch. Since that time, Gentry worked the 
ranch on a daily basis and lived in the cabin 
nearly full time. Milton died in 1962 and, by 
holographic will, left the ranch to Ivy Jane 
and their six children. After his father died, 
Gentry continued to work the ranch. In 1966, 
Gentry's siblings and Ivy Jane executed a 
power of attorney authorizing Gentry to 
manage the ranch. When Ivy died intestate in 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
C O D E • CO 
PTOVO, Uuh 
State v. G 
Hllluh\riY 
1977, Gentry and his siblings each inherited an 
equal share of the ranch. 
Soon after Gentry began managing the 
ranch, antagonism developed between Gentry 
and his siblings. Their relationship eroded and 
the family began to question Gentry's autho-
rity to manage the ranch. The ranch also 
became the subject of a series of lawsuits and 
court-ordered sales. In 1981, as a result of a 
lawsuit to partition the ranch, the district 
court ordered a sale of the ranch. Gentry's 
interest in the ranch was purchased for appr-
oximately $22,000. Gentry objected to the 
validity of the sale, claiming that the payment 
was intended solely to reimburse him for 
improvements and work he had performed on 
the ranch. Several months passed before he 
negotiated the check representing his sale 
proceeds. He allegedly later used the money 
for improvements and upkeep on the ranch. 
After the 1981 partition sale, Gentry conti-
nued to use the ranch. In 1983, Gentry reta-
ined an attorney and attempted to purchase a 
portion of the ranch from two of the owners, 
but did not consummate any purchase. On 
November 10, 1986, Gentry's brothers, Mack 
and Joseph Gentry, each sold their interest in 
the ranch to Dan and Paul Roberts, sons of 
Gentry's sister, Mary Lou. 
In 1986 and 1987, without permission from 
the ranch owners, Gentry and his son, Curtis, 
received payments from Carlyle Stirling for 
grazing on the ranch property. They did not 
transmit any of the monies collected from 
Stirling to the ranch owners. 
Dan and Paul Roberts brought charges of 
theft by deception and criminal trespass 
against Gentry and his son Curtis. Gentry and 
his son countered with a civil suit for quiet 
title and adverse possession against all the 
ranch co-tenants. 
On September 20, 1988, Gentry appeared at 
an arraignment before Judge J. Philip Eves. 
Gentry reviewed and signed an affidavit, 
which set forth the charge of theft, but not the 
alleged facts. Gentry pled not guilty. 
Trial was held before Judge Eves on 
January 25, 1989. After the close of evidence, 
but prior to closing arguments, Gentry 
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of 
theft, a third degree felony. The State dismi-
ssed the criminal trespass charge. Imposition 
of sentence was stayed pending Gentry's suc-
cessful completion of eighteen months prob-
ation. Conditions of probation included 
Gentry agreeing to 1) not enter the ranch 
property without prior written consent of Paul 
or Dan Roberts, 2) not harass or offensively 
communicate with any family member, 3) 
dismiss his pending civil suit against persons 
holding an ownership interest in the ranch 
property, and 4) relinquish any interest in the 
property. 
On February 16, 1989, Gentry's counsel 
withdrew. Gentry retained new counsel and on 
UTAH ADVA 
February 24, 1989, filed a notice of appeal of 
the trial court's decision. On April 6, 1989, 
Gentry filed a motion and supporting memo-
randum to withdraw his guilty plea and to 
remand for a preliminary hearing. This court 
stayed the appeal for sixty days or until the 
trial court ruled on Gentry's motion to with-
draw his guilty plea. On August 28, 1989, 
Gentry filed a motion for a new trial and a 
motion to disqualify Judge Eves, with supp-
orting memorandum, affidavit of Gentry, and 
certificate of counsel. On September 1, 1989, 
Judge Eves denied Gentry's motion to with-
draw the plea, but did not rule on Gentry's 
other two motions. 
On appeal, Gentry argues that the trial 
court erred by 1) denying Gentry's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea; 2) failing to dispose 
of his motion to disqualify the trial judge; and 
3) failing to dispose of his motion for a new 
trial. Gentry also claims he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel.1 
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA 
Gentry claims the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Specifically, Gentry argues that 
the trial court failed to explain to Gentry the 
elements and facts of the crime of theft before 
he pled guilty, and that the trial court further 
erred by relying on an incomplete record as a 
substitute for Rule 11 compliance, in determ-
ining that Gentry entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its consequ-
ences. Gentry also asserts that his hearing 
impairment precluded him from being able to 
fully understand the factual elements of the 
charges during the course of the trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1990) states, 
in pertinent part, that "[a] plea of guilty ... 
may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of court." We will 
reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea only when it clearly appears the 
trial court has abused its discretion by failing 
to find good cause. State v. MildenhalU 747 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987); State v. Vasilaco-
pulos, 756 P.2d 92,93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Rule 11(5)2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty or no contest, and 
may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elem-
ents.... 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). 
In cases considered prior to 1987, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the record as a whole 
may affirmatively establish that defendant 
entered his or her guilty plea with full know-
ledge and understanding of its consequences 
and of the rights waived. Stare v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Warner 
v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 
1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), however, the supreme court modified 
its prior decisions and held that the trial court 
has the burden of ensuring that Rule 11(5) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty 
plea is entered. Id. at 1312-13. The supreme 
court stated that "to make a knowing guilty 
plea, the defendants must understand the ele-
ments of the crimes charged and the relation-
ship of the law to the facts." Id. at 1312. Gib-
bons noted that a sufficient affidavit may 
be a starting point in determining whether a 
defendant has an adequate understanding; 
however, the court "should then review the 
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, 
question the defendant concerning his under-
standing of it, and fulfill the other requirem-
ents imposed by §77-35-11 on the record 
before accepting the guilty plea." Id. at 1314. 
If a court does not use an affidavit, the req-
uirements in Gibbons and in Rule 11(5) must 
likewise be met and be on the record. Id. 
This court has interpreted Gibbons as effe-
ctively replacing the "record as a whole" test 
with a strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in 
accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Stare v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 
94.3 The supreme court also has regarded Gib-
bons as a new rule of criminal procedure, 
constituting a clear break with the past. State 
v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 
1989) (per curiam). Consequently, both Utah 
appellate courts have refused to apply the Gib-
bons strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty 
p l e a s . See, e.g., Hickman, 7 7 9 
P.2d at 672 n.l; Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 
94. 
The State claims, however, that the "record 
as a whole" test remains viable even after Gib-
bons. The State contends that a close 
reading of Gibbons reveals that the supreme 
court was simply pointing out the preferred 
and safest method of determining the volunt-
ariness of a plea. The State reasons that since 
the supreme court was able to review the tra-
nscript and determine that the examination of 
Gibbons was inadequate, it would have rem-
anded the case with an order that the plea be 
withdrawn rather than remanding for a 
hearing on the issue of voluntariness if it int-
ended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 com-
pliance. The State also relies on Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) and Srare v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) to 
demonstrate that the supreme court, even after 
Gibbons, relies on the "record as a whole" 
test. 
We cannot agree. First, the State misconst-
rues Gibbons. Gibbons does not simply state a 
preferred method for determining the volunt-
ariness of a plea, but clearly mandates that the 
trial court must conduct an on-the-record 
review with defendant of the Rule 11(5) req-
uirements. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14. 
Also, the supreme court did not remand Gib-
bons for a hearing on the issue of volunt-
ariness, but for the purpose of allowing defe-
ndant to move to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he had not previously filed such 
motion. Id. at 1311. Finally, it appears that 
the court applied the "record as a whole" test 
in Jolivet and Copeland because the guilty 
pleas in both cases were entered before the Gib-
bons decision: Jolivet entered his plea in 
1984, see State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 843-
44 (Utah 1986) (date of plea revealed in 
Jolivet's first appeal), and Copeland entered 
his plea in 1986. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1267. 
In this case the record clearly shows that the 
trial judge failed to comply with Gibbons and 
Rule 11(5). The trial judge did not conduct an 
on-the-record inquiry concerning Gentry's 
understanding of the nature and elements of 
the offense as required by Rule ll(5)(d). The 
trial court simply determined that because 
Gentry was present at trial, he was aware of 
the evidence which had been admitted and the 
charges against him. However, his understa-
nding of the elements of the crime charged 
and how those elements relate to the evidence 
presented may not be presumed from his mere 
presence during trial.. See Valencia, 776 P.2d 
at 1335. We furtherTmd it particularly nece-
ssary to require strict Rule 11 compliance in 
this instance, where Gentry contends his 
hearing disability prevented him from under-
standing everything that went on during the 
trial as well as during the proceedings regar-
ding his guilty plea. 
Rule 11(5) and Gibbons require the vacating 
of Gentry's guilty plea on the ground that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. See 
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989). 
Thus, we reverse and remand to allow Gentry 
to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to a 
new trial on the original charges.4 In light of 
our decision, we do not reach Gentry's other 
claims. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. The State argues that this appeal is moot since 
Gentry will complete his eighteen month probation 
before this court's opinion issues. We do not agree 
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because the conditions of Gentry's probation, incl-
uding his promise to abandon both his pending civil 
action and any interest in the ranch, will continue 
despite completion of probation. 
2. In 1989, the subsection in former Rule 11(e) was 
redesignated as Rule 11(5). See 1989 Utah Laws, ch. 
65, §2. 
3. In Stale v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), this court used "the record as a 
whole" language in the opinion, but the issue argued 
by appellant was that he did not voluntarily plead 
guilty, because he mistakenly relied on the state's 
assurance that it would recommend probation rather 
than incarceration. Neither the state nor appellant 
addressed the issue of whether Gibbons had resulted 
in the demise of the "record as a whole" test. The-
refore, we do not read Thurston as supporting the 
state's position in this case. 
4. Usually, when a guilty plea is rescinded the 
parties are to be placed in the position each had 
before the contract was entered into. People v. 
Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 256, 258, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 426, 428 (1982); see also Wilson v. State, 698 
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) 
(rejects prior case law dictum that permitting a 
withdrawal of a guilty plea was, in effect, the gra-
nting of a new trial). This case, however, presents 
an unusual factual setting. Although the parties 
represented to the trial court that all the evidence 
had been presented prior to the change of plea, it is 
not clear how Gentry would have proceeded had the 
guilty plea not been entered. Further, Judge Eves 
stated in his decision that the court was prepared to 
determine that Gentry was proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the time of trial of both 
charges, even if Gentry had not pled guilty. Since 
neither counsel had presented closing arguments and 
since it is possible that absent the guilty plea Gentry 
would have produced further evidence, we find the 
trial court's declaration of a guilty verdict at the 
time of the plea nonbinding on remand. Conseque-
ntly, we find that a new trial is essential to ensure 
that Gentry has a fair hearing on the charges. 
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